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Abstract. Introducing a price on greenhouse gas emissions would not only contribute to
reducing the risk of dangerous anthropogenic climate change, but would also generate
substantial public revenues. Some of these revenues could be used to cover investment
needs  for  infrastructure  providing  access  to  water,  sanitation,  electricity,  tele-
communications and transport. In this way, emission pricing could promote sustainable
socio-economic  development  by  safeguarding  the  stability  of  natural  systems  which
constitute  the material  basis  of  economies,  while  at  the same time providing public
goods that are essential for human well-being. For a scenario that is consistent with
limiting global  warming to below 2°C,  we find that domestic carbon pricing (without
redistribution of revenues across countries) has substantial potential to close existing
access gaps for water, sanitation, electricity, and telecommunication. However, for the
majority  of  countries  carbon  pricing  revenues  would  not  be  sufficient  to  pave  all
unpaved roads, and for most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa they would be insufficient
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to provide universal access to all types of infrastructure except water. If some fraction of
the global revenues of carbon pricing is redistributed, e.g. via the Green Climate Fund,
more ambitious infrastructure access goals could be achieved in developing countries.
Our  paper  also bears  relevance for  the design of  climate finance mechanisms,  as  it
suggests that supporting carbon pricing policies instead of project based finance might
not only permit cost-efficient emission reductions, but also leverage public revenues to
promote human development goals.
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1. Introduction
Recent research has furthered our understanding of the dangers of continued global
warming (IPCC 2014a). A projected increase of the global mean temperature of 4°C or
more in 2100 would entail  potentially  serious consequences for  sea-level  rise,  water
availability,  agricultural  productivity,  and  human  health,  in  particular  in  developing
countries (World Bank 2012). In order to prevent these impacts, considerable reductions
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission will be required, not only in industrialized, but also in
developing  economies  (Jakob  and  Steckel  2014).  The  Kyoto  Protocol  included
internationally  binding commitments  to  reduce emissions  for  industrialized (Annex-I)
countries, whereas developing and emerging (non-Annex-I) countries participated in a
voluntary way under the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. With
the Durban Agreement, states have agreed that a future climate treaty should entail
efforts  from all  parties  (UNFCCC 2011).  All  countries  are  requested  to  declare  their
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intended efforts to reduce emissions (at least compared to projected future emissions)
in the form of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). The most recent
INDCs include targets by 187 countries, including all major emerging economies as well
as numerous developing and least-developed countries.1
At  the  same  time,  poor  countries  face  immediate  challenges  related  to  poverty
reduction.  For  instance,  globally  many  people  lack  access  to  basic  infrastructure,
including  electricity,  water,  and  sanitation.  In  view  of  these  pressing  issues,  it  is
paramount to formulate climate policies in a larger sustainable development framework,
which considers climate targets in combination with other development goals (Halsnæs
and Garg 2011).
This paper examines the potential  of carbon price revenues to finance infrastructure
access. We argue that such an approach would constitute a promising option to advance
sustainable development by mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and at the same time
advancing  socio-economic  development.  Hence,  the results  of  this  paper  are  closely
linked to the discussion on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular the
question of how to finance the post-2015 development agenda.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  reviews  the  literature,  and
Section 3 explains how we calculate revenues from carbon pricing and the costs to close
infrastructure access gaps. Section 4 presents the results highlighting the implications of
our proposal for different regions. Section 5 carries out a sensitivity analysis and Section
1 http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx
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6 discusses caveats of our analysis as well as possible implementation issues. Section 7
concludes and presents policy implications. 
2. Literature Review
In order to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to a level that keeps the associated
risks  of  climate  change  at  a  manageable  level,  a  price  on  emissions  is  frequently
emphasized as the most efficient policy  (Edenhofer,  Flachsland,  et al.  2014).  Popular
approaches for carbon pricing include emission taxes and tradable permit schemes, as
well as hybrid schemes (Goulder and Parry 2008). This paper argues that carbon pricing
would not only contribute toward climate change mitigation, but could also advance
human well-being by providing the financial means to promote access to basic types of
infrastructure, including water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunication, and transport. 
This paper is related to several  strands of literature. First,  it  follows previous studies
estimating infrastructure investment needs. The dominant method in the literature to
estimate investment requirements is to regress infrastructure investments on GDP (or
vice  versa),  and  then  either  project  investment  needs  using  growth  forecasts,  or
estimate the level of investment that would maximize economic growth. Clearly, these
estimates would not be suitable for our analysis, which focuses on universal access. In
addition,  the  costs  of  reaching  certain  access  goals,  such  as  the  Millennium
Development Goals, are frequently provided on a regional instead of the country level.
For these reason, we build our own cost estimates instead of relying on already existing
ones. Earlier studies, on which our analysis builds, have examined the financial needs to
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provide universal electricity access (Pachauri et al. 2013) and the investments in water
and sanitation required to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (Hutton et al.
2012), without focusing on the question of how these investments could be financed. 
Second, our paper draws on the literature on carbon pricing. Most of this literature is
concerned with the optimal choice of policy instrument, i.e. under which conditions it is
more favourable to employ a price or a quantity instrument (Goulder and Parry 2008).
Some recent studies have also highlighted the benefits of using revenues to either lower
other (distortionary) taxes, e.g. on labour and capital (Goulder 2013), or for productive
public investment (Edenhofer et al. 2015). Third, our paper is in line with contributions
that emphasize the importance of combining natural boundaries with socio-economic
limits  into  a  broader  notion  of  sustainable  development  (Griggs  et  al.  2013).  For
instance, taxing resource use and environmental externalities to finance infrastructure
investments has been discussed as an approach to balance environmental  and social
objectives (Edenhofer, Kadner, et al. 2014; Jakob and Edenhofer 2014), and the potential
of fossil fuel subsidy reform to finance infrastructure access is explored in Jakob et al.
(2015).  Fourth,  our  paper  is  related  to  literature  on  climate  finance  as  well  as
development finance. Most analyses of climate finance (e.g. Haites 2011; Bowen 2011;
Jakob et al. 2015) are primarily  concerned with the question of how to raise revenues to
finance  mitigation  and adaptation  in  developing  countries.  Our  study  relates  to  this
literature  by  addressing  the  possibility  of  sizable  financial  transfers  resulting  from a
global climate treaty that allocates the bulk of the costs of climate change mitigation to
industrialized countries. However, we do not analyse the case in which carbon pricing
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revenues  from  industrialized  countries  are  used  to  finance  mitigation  in  developing
countries,  but focus on the case in which financial resources generated by means of
carbon pricing within countries are employed to expand access to basic infrastructure.
From this perspective, we follow the literature on innovative sources of development
finance.  For  instance,  Jha  (2004) explicitly  considers  carbon  taxes  as  a  potential
mechanism to raise resources. Likewise, a recent World Bank (2013) report on post-2015
development finance identifies carbon pricing as a promising mechanism to generate
new funds.
Our paper is to our knowledge the first to empirically link the revenue raising aspect of
carbon  pricing  with  estimates  of  infrastructure  investment  needs.  In  particular,  our
calculations show what fraction of carbon pricing revenues would be required to achieve
universal  access  to  water,  sanitation,  electricity,  telecommunication,  and  to  pave  all
hitherto unpaved roads at  the level  of  individual  countries.  Even though we present
results  for  all  countries  for  which data are  available,  the focus of  our  analysis  is  on
developing  countries,  where  infrastructure  access  gaps  are  most  pronounced
(industrialized  countries  in  general  display  very  high  access  rates  for  all  types  of
infrastructure under consideration).
3. Methodology and Data
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This  section  outlines  the  climate  scenarios  and  their  implied  revenues  from carbon
pricing, as well as the data on infrastructure access and the associated costs to close
access gaps across all world regions.2 
3.1. Scenarios of Climate Change Mitigation under Different Policies
Estimating potential revenues from carbon pricing requires the use of scenarios of future
emissions as well as carbon prices. Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) constitute the
most frequently employed tool to generate such scenarios (Luderer et al. 2011), which
are inter  alia  used as a  basis  for  the assessment of  the Intergovernmental  Panel  on
Climate Change target (IPCC 2014b). These models include a detailed description of the
techno-economic  characteristics  of  the  energy  system.  Technological  transformation
pathways and mitigation costs are calculated by comparing business-as-usual projections
(that  assume no climate change  mitigation will  occur)  with scenarios  that  impose a
constraint  on the atmospheric  concentration of  greenhouse gases (or  the associated
radiative forcing or temperature increase). 
In order to identify differences as well as robust insights across a variety of IAMs, model
comparisons are frequently carried out. The scenarios presented in this study are based
on results from seven models used in the EMF-27 model comparison (Blanford, Kriegler,
and Tavoni 2014; Krey et al. 2014; Kriegler et al. 2014)3.  As the individual models use
different  regional  aggregates,  EMF-27  results  are  available  for  four  macro-regions,
2 Access gaps and cost estimates are described in more detail in a companion paper (Fuss et al. 2015). 
Here, we only provide the most important insights.
3 Scenarios were obtained from IIASA’s AR5 scenario database (https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-
apps/ene/AR5DB). The models included in EMF-27 are AIM-Enduse 12.1, GCAM 3.1, IMAGE 2.4, MESSAGE 
V.4, POLES EMF27, REMIND 1.5, and WITCH EMF27.
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namely Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAM), Middle East and Africa (MAF) as
well as the members of the OECD in the year 1990 (OECD90).
Figure 1 provides an overview of carbon prices and emissions in the year 2020 for the
450ppm-CO2-eq.4 (ppm  denote  parts-per-million,  i.e.  the  ratio  of  molecules  of  CO2
relative  to other  gases in  the atmosphere)  stabilization scenario,  which has  an even
chance of achieving the 2°C target. The scenarios assume a globally harmonized carbon
price  and  full  availability  of  low-carbon  energy  technologies  (such  as  renewables,
nuclear,  and  carbon  capture  and  storage  (CCS)).  The  models  project  roughly  similar
emissions5 in 2020 (x-axis) for a given region (with the exception of negative emissions in
two regions for the GCAM model6), but a large variation in carbon prices (y-axis), which
range from less than US$ 20 to more than US$ 120 per ton of  CO2  (throughout the
analysis,  we  use  constant  year  2005  US$).  This  broad  span  is  mostly  explained  by
differences  in  technological  assumptions  (e.g.  on  technology  costs  or  the  speed  of
deployment of certain low-carbon energy sources) and economic mechanisms across
models.
[Figure 1: Emissions and carbon prices in the year 2020 for the 450ppm scenarios]
4 CO2-eq. denotes CO2-equivalents, a composite of CO2 as well as other GHGs, such as methane or nitrous 
oxide, which establish a common metric to assess the effect of these gases on the global mean 
temperature.
5 All emissions referred to in this study are total CO2 emissions, i.e. including CO2 emissions from land use 
change and industrial processes, but excluding non-CO2 GHGs, such as methane.
6 Negative emissions occur if more emissions are taken out of the atmosphere by e.g. afforestation or use 
of biomass in combination with CCS than are released by e.g. the combustion of fossil fuels.
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Besides differences between models, the ambition of the stabilization target as well as
restrictions on availability of certain technologies influence the carbon price. For this
reason,  we  also  briefly  analyze  550ppm  stabilization  scenarios,  which  have  an  even
chance of limiting global warming to below 3°C, and scenarios in which CCS is assumed
to  be  unavailable  as  well  as  scenarios  with  restricted  availability  of  biomass.  A  less
ambitious mitigation target will thus result in a lower carbon price, whereas foregoing
the use of CCS, or restricting biomass use, will raise it. 
In order to get a better understanding of the determinants of carbon prices, we perform
a  simple  regression  analysis,  in  which  the  year  2020  carbon  price  in  a  stabilization
scenario  (for  450ppm  and  550ppm,  and  with  full  technological  availability,  limited
biomass, as well  as without CCS, respectively) is  the dependent variable. We regress
carbon prices in each scenario on dummy variables for  the stabilization target (with
550ppm  as  the  lower-bound  benchmark  and  PPM450  taking  on  the  value  of  1  for
scenarios aiming at atmospheric GHG stabilization at 450ppm), technological availability
(with FullTech as the benchmark, and NoCCS and LimBio denoting scenarios without CCS
or limited availability of biomass) and a model-specific dummy variable (which gives the
ceteris  paribus  difference  to  the  average)  using  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS).  As
technological  options can be expected to be of  higher relevance for  more ambitious
stabilization targets, we further include interaction terms for the dummy variables on
the  stabilization  target  and  technological  availability  (PPM450_NoCCS  and
PPM450_LimBio). The results reported in Table 1 should not be regarded as a draw from
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a  random  sample  but  rather  be  interpreted  as  conditional  means.  Hence,  standard
errors and significance levels are uninformative.
[Table 1: Results of regression analysis]
Our preferred specification includes model-specific dummies as well as interaction terms
for  stabilization  target  and technology availability  (first  column),  as  this  specification
contains  the  highest  number  of  explanatory  variables  and  hence  permits  the  most
detailed explanation of differences in carbon prices across scenarios. The results indicate
the following: first, for the case of full availability of technologies, mitigation costs in the
450ppm scenario are on average about US$ 28 higher than for the 550ppm scenario.
Second,  for  the 550ppm scenario, excluding CCS and limiting biomass use raises the
carbon  price  moderately,  by  roughly  US$  8  and  US$  3,  respectively.  Third,  these
technologies are significantly more important for the more ambitious 450ppm scenario.
That is, not having CCS available would then raise carbon prices by more than US$ 108,
and limiting biomass use would raise carbon prices by almost US$ 20. Finally, as already
highlighted  in  Figure  1,  there  is  a  pronounced  difference  in  carbon  prices  between
models, with the lowest values for GCAM, and the highest for REMIND.
3.2. Carbon Pricing Revenues and International Transfers
For  our  revenue  projections,  we  take  the  450ppm  scenario  with  full  technological
availability as a benchmark scenario (alternative scenarios are explored in the sensitivity
analysis). We take emissions and carbon prices from the POLES model, as this model
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yields the median revenues of the seven EMF-27 models. Under this scenario, global
energy-related CO2 emissions keep rising (albeit slowly) from 30.6 GtCO2 in 2010 to 31.7
GtCO2 in 2020, before starting to decline. In 2030, they amount to 23 GtCO2. The implied
carbon price is US$ 5 per ton of CO2 in 2010, rising by nearly 20% per year. In the year
2020, it amounts to US$ 40 per ton of CO2, and in 2030 to US$ 175 per ton of CO2. As we
require  revenues  on  the  country  level  for  our  analysis,  we  apply  annual  regional
emission  growth  rates  in  the  period  2010-2030  from  POLES  to  extrapolate  from
emissions in the year 2010. Further, as the model scenarios provide emission prices in
10-year intervals only, we estimate annual prices by assuming a constant rate of increase
from 2010 to 2030. 
With these assumptions, we arrive at global revenues of US$ 23.8 trn over the period
2015-2030, or on average US$ 1.6 trn per year. In Section 4, which presents the main
results of  our analysis,  we focus on revenues that would occur if  a globally uniform
carbon  price  would  be  implemented  in  each  country,  without  transfer  of  financial
resources across countries. For instance, India would then on average raise US$ 115 bn
per year, and China more than US$ 480 bn. For countries that are low emitters and for
which rather low emission growth is expected, however, carbon pricing would constitute
a limited source of public revenue. This is particularly true for numerous countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, for which annual revenues would lie below US$ 1
bn per year. Figure 2 provides an overview of average annual revenues on a regionally
aggregated basis for the benchmark scenario and compares these with revenues under
different  assumptions  on  the  stabilization  target  and  technological  availability.
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Interestingly, revenues are quite similar across scenarios, which is explained by the fact
that higher emissions (e.g. under a laxer reduction target) are compensated by lower
carbon prices, and vice versa.7 The main exception is the 450ppm NoCCS scenario. If the
option to sequester emissions is not available in the second half  of the 21st century,
more  rapid  reductions  are  required  earlier  (i.e.  before  2030)  that  are  not  fully
compensated by a higher emission price.
[Figure 2: Average annual revenues from carbon pricing under different stabilization
scenarios and technology assumptions]
This  pattern  of  how  revenues  accrue  to  individual  world  regions  could  change
dramatically  if  some of  the  revenues  from  carbon  pricing  were  redistributed  across
countries. A central aspect of the discussion of equitable climate policy considers the
burden  sharing  scheme,  i.e.  how the  global  costs  of  emission  reductions  are  to  be
divided  (Mattoo and Subramanian 2012). For this reason, we discuss three alternative
mechanisms  of  dividing  the  revenues  from carbon pricing.  Following  Raupach et  al.
(2014),  we  look  at  scenarios  in  which  the  share  of  revenues  is  determined  (i)  in
proportion to actual emissions (X=0, no redistribution), (ii) in proportion to population
(X=1,  equal  per-capita),  and  (iii)  the  average  (X=0.5)  of  the  former  two  schemes,
reflecting different notions of justice and political feasibility incorporated in the scheme
for revenue sharing (or burden sharing, respectively). 
7 Likewise, one should expect delayed climate action to result in comparable revenues, as (i) a higher 
carbon price would be necessary in later years to bend the emission trajectory downward, and (ii) 
emissions would have increased by then, such that there would be a larger tax base.
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[Figure 3: Average annual revenues from carbon pricing under different allocation
schemes]
Figure 3 shows the average annual revenues under these revenue-sharing schemes. East
Asia & Pacific,  Europe & Central  Asia and North America would be large net payers.
Under the scheme X=0.5 (i.e. scheme iii), these regions would provide annual financial
transfers of about US$ 90 bn, US$ 50 bn, and US$ 80 bn, respectively (and twice that
amount under X=1, i.e. scheme ii).  The aggregate transfers would hence significantly
exceed  current  levels  of  official  development  assistance  (ODA),  which  amounted  to
about US$ 135 bn in 2013 (OECD 2014). By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa would receive
more than US$ 100 bn, and South Asia more than US$ 120 bn per year (and twice that
amount under scheme ii).
The  extent  to  which  carbon  pricing  revenues  could  contribute  towards  existing
infrastructure access gaps will be the subject of the following section. For the analysis,
we will focus on the 450ppm scenario with full technological availability, and the scheme
in which revenues are derived exclusively by means of domestic carbon pricing (i.e. X=0).
The effect of alternative revenue sharing schemes can then be inferred from calculating
its ratio relative to the case of X=0 (i.e. if revenues under a given scheme are, say, twice
as  high  as  under  domestic  carbon pricing,  only  half  of  the fraction indicated in  our
analysis below will be required to achieve universal access to a given infrastructure).
13
3.3. Access to Infrastructure
For the purpose of this paper, we regard infrastructure as the basic physical structures
needed for the operation of a society. As highlighted by a recent United Nations report,
infrastructure constitutes the largest share of  SDG investment needs  (UNTT Working
Group on Sustainable Development Financing 2013). Achieving universal access to key
types of infrastructures is a necessary, albeit not a sufficient, condition for reaching the
SDGs. The goal of this study is to determine whether revenues from emission pricing
would be sufficient to ensure that this necessary condition is met by enabling universal
(i.e.  100%)  access  to water,  sanitation,  electricity  and telecommunication,  and allow
paving of all unpaved roads8. 
Access to water refers to the share of the population using an improved drinking water
source, such as piped water, public taps or standpipes, tube wells or boreholes (World
Bank 2014). Improved sanitation facilities include piped sewer systems, septic tanks, pit
latrines,  and  composting  toilets  (World  Bank  2014).  Electricity  access  measures  the
percent of households with an electricity connection (Pachauri et al. 2013).  Note that
providing  universal  electricity  access  would,  even if  conventional  energy sources  are
used, only have a small impact on global emissions and hence not contradict the goal of
safeguarding environmental quality (Pachauri 2014; Rao, Riahi, and Grubler 2014).
8 Access to roads is essential for e.g. access to markets (Jacoby 2000).We suppose that all unpaved roads 
are in place because there is an actual need for them. Even though these roads do not necessarily need to 
be paved to ensure access, paving would substantially ease transportation. Hence, the requirement of 
paving all unpaved roads considered in this paper can be regarded as an upper limit for the investment 
needs required to ensure access to transportation services. Quantification of investment needs for public 
transportation is, due to data limitations, beyond the scope of this paper.
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For telecommunication, having a mobile phone plus 10 minutes of airtime per day were
taken as a target (ITU 2014). We do not consider the construction of landlines, as it can
be  expected  that  the  largest  part  of  new  telecommunication  infrastructure  will  be
mobile. In addition, costs for landlines are not straightforward to estimate, as they likely
depend on population density and geographical factors.
Finally, for transportation, we assume paving all currently unpaved roads as the target to
be achieved (World Bank 2014). 
These  types  of  infrastructure are  essential  for  human  development  in  the  sense  of
creating the capabilities to allow people to pursue their individual aims (Drèze and Sen
2013) and are also crucial determinants of  multi-dimensional deprivation (Alkire 2002)
and social inequality  (Binelli, Loveless, and Whitefield 2015). Undoubtedly, other types
of  infrastructure such as education and healthcare are also crucial  for  development.
However, we limit our analysis to the above types of infrastructure, as a definition of
universal  access  is  more  straightforward  than  for  health  or  education,  reliable  cost
estimates for the latter areas are not readily available on a global basis and we perceive
them to more basic and conditioning some of the softer types of infrastructure.
[Table 2: Share of population lacking access to electricity, water, sanitation,
telecommunication and share of unpaved roads]
Table 2 provides an overview of access gaps aggregated at the regional level. These gaps
are in general most pronounced for Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than one third of
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the population does not have access to water, and more than two thirds lack access to
sanitation  and  electricity.  Likewise,  in  South  Asia,  more  than  60%  lack  access  to
sanitation, and more than two thirds do not have access to telecommunication.
For  our  analysis,  we  examine  a  scenario  in  which  infrastructure  investments  are
undertaken over a horizon of 15 years, corresponding to the 2015-2030 timeframe of
the  Sustainable  Development  Goals  (Griggs  et  al.  2013).  We  assume  that  without
intervention, the share of the population lacking access to a certain infrastructure in the
year  2030  would  be  the  same  as  in  the  year  2010  (hence  our  estimates  can  be
considered conservative, as with economic growth it can be expected that access gaps
start to shrink as part of the economy’s development process; see also Section 6). The
access gap for each country is then calculated by multiplying this share with the medium
scenario of the population forecast for 2030 from the United Nations World Population
Prospects (UN 2013).
3.4. Costs of Providing Infrastructure
The costs for infrastructure access and paving roads were collected from the literature.
Where data for individual countries was not available, we used regional averages. For
recurrent  costs  (i.e.  costs  that  occur  on  a  regular  basis,  such  as  maintenance  and
depreciation), we assumed that infrastructure build-up is distributed equally over the
considered 15-year horizon. This yields an average time of 7.5 years for which these
expenses need to be met.
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For the cost estimate of enabling universal access to clean water and sanitation, we rely
on  the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  study  by  Hutton  et  al.  (2012).  This  study
estimates  the incremental  costs  of  extending  access  to  water  supply  and sanitation,
taking into account investments costs (including planning,  construction, protection of
water sources, training etc.) as well as recurrent costs.
For costs of electricity access, which can be achieved by means of grid expansion or
decentralized  sources,  we  employ  cost  projections  from  the  energy  system  model
MESSAGE-Access (Pachauri et al. 2013) as the basis for our calculation. MESSAGE-Access
is a household fuel choice model that explicitly accounts for heterogeneous economic
conditions and the preferred energy choices of poor populations living in rural and urban
settings, based on data from nationally representative consumer surveys.
Concerning  the  costs  of  paving  unpaved  roads,  we  use  data  from  the  International
Energy  Agency  (2013).  This  study  collects  aggregate  costs  of  construction  and
maintenance  for  different  types  of  roads  (e.g.  expressways,  motorways,  and  access
roads) in different locations (e.g. urban, interurban, and rural) on a regional basis.
Finally, costs for providing access to mobile connections is assumed to be 150 US$ fixed
costs per connection, which is in line with the range of different studies reported in
Rothman et al. (2014). For the cost of usage, we assume a price of 2 cents per minute of
air time.
At global scale, our cost calculations indicate that universal access to water could be
achieved by investing US$ 190 bn per year, US$ 370 bn could cover universal access to
sanitation,  and  US$  430  bn  could  finance  universal  access  to  electricity.  Providing
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universal  access  to  telecommunication  would  amount  to  US$  2.6  trn  annually,  and
paving all unpaved roads to US$ 8.7 trn. 
The next section examines to which extent these infrastructure investment needs could
be covered by revenues from carbon pricing.
4. Results
Our  key  results  are  shown  in  Figure  4,  which  displays  the  share  of  carbon  pricing
revenues that would need to be invested in a particular type of infrastructure over a
period of 15 years to achieve universal access. Even though we conduct our analysis for
all countries for which data are available, the results are most relevant for developing
countries, for which lack of access plays a crucial role for socio-economic development.
A darker color denotes that a larger share of the revenues would be required, i.e. a
lower  potential  of  carbon pricing  to close  access  gaps.  Dark  purple  indicates  shares
greater than one, which means that revenues would be insufficient to fully close existing
access gaps. White denotes countries that already display universal access, such that a
zero share of carbon pricing revenues would be required. Countries for which no data
are available are shaded in grey.
For water (panel a), the results indicate that carbon pricing revenues would be sufficient
to cover the costs of universal access for all countries except for Chad, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Mali, and Somalia. Whereas the required share is rather low
(<10%) for most countries, some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia
would require 20% or more of their carbon pricing revenues to achieve universal access.
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A notable exception in Latin America is Ecuador, where the required share is more that
30%, which is due to the rather large access gap as well as still low emissions, which
result in low carbon pricing revenues.
For sanitation (panel b), carbon pricing revenues would be more than sufficient to cover
investment needs in all of South Asia and Latin America. Notably, India would require
only about 4%, Sri Lanka 2%, and Bangladesh as well as Pakistan each about 11% of their
revenues to close the access gaps. Given that more than 60% of South Asia’s population
lacks access to sanitation,  this  potential  is  quite remarkable.  For Sub-Saharan Africa,
there  is  less  potential,  as  carbon  pricing  revenues  would  exceed  the  infrastructure
investment needs for sanitation for about half of the countries in the region. However,
Senegal,  Cabo  Verde,  Swaziland,  Zimbabwe,  Gabon,  and  Angola  could  all  achieve
universal access to sanitation for 10% or less of their carbon pricing revenues.
For electricity infrastructure (panel c), more than half of the countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa could not meet their entire investment needs by means of carbon pricing, and the
majority of the remainder would require 50% or more. On the other hand, practically all
countries  in  Latin  America  (except  Haiti,  Guatemala  and  Nicaragua)  could  achieve
universal  access at  10% or less of their carbon pricing revenues, owing to the lower
access gaps as well as lower costs per connection (which are due to higher population
densities in these areas compared to Africa)9. For Asia, there is a wide range of required
investments  in  electric  infrastructure,  ranging  from  less  than  1%  in  Indonesia  and
Mongolia to almost 99% in Timor-Leste.
9 Note that providing universal electricity access would only have a small impact on emissions and hence 
not contradict the goal of safeguarding environmental quality (Pachauri 2014; Rao, Riahi, and Grubler 
2014).
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For  telecommunication  (panel  d),  most  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  would require
investments far beyond the revenues that could be obtained by carbon pricing (for many
countries  in  this  regions,  investment  needs  for  information  and  communication
technology (ICT) exceed carbon pricing revenues by a factor of ten or more). Despite
that finding, carbon pricing could still be an important ingredient of policies to expand
access to telecommunication, especially when one takes into account that only a certain
fraction of ICT infrastructure will need to be financed by public budgets. In addition,
technological  progress  is  likely  to  result  in  lower  costs  in  the  future,  and economic
growth can be expected to contribute to increased access (the implications of these
aspects for our results are discussed in more detail in Section 6). For most of South Asia,
carbon  pricing  revenues  would  be  sufficient  to  achieve  universal  access  to
telecommunication, but a rather high share of about 50% or more would be needed.
Given that some part of revenues may be dedicated to other purposes, the full amount
of investment required for ICT infrastructure might then not be available. By contrast,
most countries in Latin America could provide universal access to telecommunication for
about 10-20% of their carbon pricing revenues. 
Finally, the investment needed to pave all unpaved roads (panel e) would exceed carbon
pricing  revenues  several-fold  for  more  than  30  countries.  This  concerns  not  only
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,  which display low carbon pricing revenues,  but also
several countries with higher revenues in Latin America, South and South-East Asia as
well as Eastern and Central Europe and New Zealand. For the latter countries, this result
is due to the relatively high absolute amount of unpaved roads. In any case, it should be
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emphasized that paving all unpaved roads is a rather stringent requirement that likely
goes  beyond  what  can  be  deemed  necessary  to  provide  basic  access  to  transport
services.
In summary, our results indicate that carbon pricing could provide revenues to achieve
universal access to water, sanitation, and electricity during the period 2015-2030 in most
parts of the world. Yet, our analysis also highlights that carbon pricing only has limited
potential to close access gaps in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is mostly explained by the
low  emissions  and  hence  low  revenues  in  this  region.  Different  schemes  of  how
revenues are shared could, however, drastically change this result. For instance, if the
above  calculations  are  carried  out  under  the  assumption  that  global  carbon  pricing
revenues are  distributed by the average between ‘no  redistribution’  and ‘equal  per-
capita’ (i.e. the X=0.5 scheme), revenues are sufficient to finance universal access to any
single type of infrastructure except roads in all parts of the world, or access to water,
sanitation, and electricity combined. The results of this analysis are shown Figure A1 of
the Appendix.
[Figure 4: Share of carbon pricing revenues required to finance universal access to
infrastructure]
In the next section, we assess the robustness of our results by testing for the impact of
different assumptions regarding the stabilization target and availability of  low-carbon
technologies, both of which have important consequences for the carbon price. 
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5. Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented above were derived for a scenario that assumes stabilization of
the atmospheric GHG concentration at 450ppm (i.e. an even chance of staying below
2°C) with a full portfolio of technology options. As the use of some technologies might
be restricted either because they might not be socially acceptable, more costly than
expected, technologically infeasible, or associated with unforeseen risks or unacceptable
trade-offs,  we also examine two alternative  settings,  in which the use of  biomass  is
limited (LimBio), and in which CCS is assumed to be unavailable (NoCCS). Furthermore,
we also examine scenarios aiming at less ambitious climate targets, namely 550ppm (i.e.
an even chance of not exceeding 3°C), and vary the costs of infrastructure investment by
+/- 50%. This leaves us with a total of 18 scenarios (3x3x2 for technology assumptions,
assumed investment costs, and the stabilization target). The required shares of carbon
pricing revenues for each infrastructure are shown on a regional level in Figure 5 (a value
of, say, 0.1 states that 10% of carbon pricing revenues would be required to achieve
universal access, and values larger than one indicate that revenues would be insufficient
to fully cover investment needs). 
[Figure 5: Results of sensitivity analysis]
This analysis shows that for water and sanitation investment needs could – on aggregate
– be fully met by carbon pricing revenues for all regions, even under scenarios in which
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relatively low revenues are generated for regions with large access gaps. For electricity,
this  is  true  for  all  regions  except  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (where  revenues  would  be
insufficient for scenarios with low revenues and high investment costs). This regionally
aggregated perspective does not take into account the underlying differences between
individual  countries.  For  instance,  even  under  the  most  optimistic  assumptions  on
revenues as well as costs, a large number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa would not
be able to fully meet their investment needs for sanitation or electricity.
This  sensitivity  analysis  also  highlights  that  only  under  the  most  optimistic  of
assumptions  (i.e.  high  revenues  and  low  investment  costs)  carbon  pricing  revenues
would be sufficient to finance universal  access to telecommunication in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The same is true for paving all unpaved roads in Latin America and South Asia.
This  optimistic  scenario  seems  especially  unlikely,  as  (perhaps  in  contrast  to  ICT
equipment) significant cost reductions in road construction do not seem plausible. For
Sub-Saharan Africa, by contrast, carbon pricing revenues would be insufficient to pave all
roads even under the most favourable assumption, where total costs exceed revenues
more  than  two-fold  (and  more  than  twelve-fold  under  the  most  pessimistic  set  of
assumption).
6. Discussion 
One important qualification to our analysis  is  that it  does not take into account the
intrinsic link between infrastructure and economic growth. On the one hand, continued
economic growth can be expected to help closing existing access gaps, even without
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new finance from innovative sources, such as carbon pricing. Including this aspect into
our analysis would not only require plausible assumptions on future economic growth –
a major challenge in its own right – but also a clear understanding of the determinants
of  infrastructure  access.  The  related  literature  suggests  considerable  heterogeneity
across countries far beyond what is explained by differences in income levels  (Onyeji,
Bazilian, and Nussbaumer 2012; Winkler et al. 2011). For this reason, projecting future
access gaps as a function of assumed growth rates would probably do more to confound
than  to  clarify  our  analysis.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  plausible  that  infrastructure
investments spur economic growth. Previous  literature has  highlighted the economic
benefits of e.g. electrification (Grogan and Sadanand 2013) and roads (Shami 2012) for
select countries. On the cross-country level, several authors have found large returns to
infrastructure  investments  (Calderon  and  Serven  2014;  Gupta  et  al.  2014).  Yet,  the
coefficients estimated in these studies present an average over the sample and may hide
a  large  degree  of  underlying  heterogeneity.  For  this  reason,  it  seems  premature  to
simply  apply  these  coefficients  to  assess  how  economic  growth  responds  to
infrastructure investment, as such an approach would need to assume that all countries
respond in an identical way.
A  further  caveat  is  that  not  all  infrastructure  investments  necessarily  need  to  be
financed  by  the  government,  but  could  see  involvement  by  the  private  sector.  The
optimal composition of private and public provision of infrastructure services depends
on the assessment of potential trade-offs between equity and efficiency considerations
(Birdsall and Nellis 2003). In any case, with participation of the private sector, a lower
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share  of  carbon  pricing  revenues  than  the  one  indicated  in  our  analysis  would  be
required to achieve universal access. This point might be particularly relevant for ICT
infrastructure, where substantial involvement of the public sector is common.
Due to both reasons stated above (i.e. economic growth and involvement of the private
sector), our results should be regarded as conservative, as they indicate the share of
carbon pricing revenues that would be sufficient to achieve universal access even if no
improvements  due  to  economic  growth  would  occur,  and  even if  the  infrastructure
investments were fully funded by the public sector.
Obviously,  alternative uses of  the proceeds from carbon pricing are conceivable.  For
instance, a certain fraction could be used for dedicated green technology policies, such
as R&D subsidies or feed-in-tariffs (Dresner et al. 2006). Investing revenues from carbon
pricing in infrastructure could also create synergies between climate change mitigation
and  adaptation,  as  areas  lacking  access  to  infrastructure  services  are  particularly
vulnerable  to  climate  impacts  (Malik  and  Smith  2012).  Our  analysis  does  not  make
explicit assumptions on what fraction of carbon pricing revenues will be directed toward
these purposes. By calculating the share of revenues that would be required to achieve
universal access to a particular type of infrastructure, it is left for the readers’ judgement
whether such revenue recycling is deemed to be realistic. In any case, it seems likely that
investments that yield large development benefits while only requiring a few percent of
carbon pricing revenues would stand a good chance of becoming actually implemented.
Another aspect that needs to be considered is the practical implementation of a scheme
that uses carbon pricing revenues for infrastructure investment.  Clearly, carbon pricing
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imposes  additional  costs  on  consumers  of  energy  services  and  are  thus  frequently
opposed, at least in countries without either strong civil  society or a well-established
green industry (Never and Betz 2014). However, if combined with appropriate spending
policies, these additional costs can easily be more than compensated by the benefits of
infrastructure  access,  provided  that  high  quality  service  delivery  can  be  ensured  by
holding governments accountable for public sector performance (Fox 2015). Under such
circumstances, recent research suggests that by earmarking revenues for uses that are
regarded  as  worthwhile  by  the  population,  political  feasibility  of  market-based
environmental  policies can be increased  (Kallbekken,  Kroll,  and Cherry 2011).  Hence,
redirecting  carbon  pricing  revenues  to  infrastructure  investments  could  provide  a
mechanism that commits policy-makers to use these revenues in a pre-determined way
and  thus  reduce  opportunities  for  embezzlement.  In  addition,  some fraction  of  the
revenues from carbon pricing may be employed to compensate political losers, e.g. by
lowering other taxes.
Finally, one could question the assumption of carbon pricing in developing countries in
the near future. Without carbon prices, there would (at least in the absence of transfers
from  industrialized  countries)  of  course  be  no  revenues  that  could  be  invested  in
infrastructure.  However,  it  seems highly  unlikely  that  the 2°C target  can be reached
without carbon pricing in developing countries, and we point out that the potential to
promote  human  development  by  investing  the  associated  revenues  could  yield  an
incentive  to  implement  carbon  prices.  We  are  rather  optimistic  that  at  least  some
carbon pricing in developing countries will prevail in the near future, as China, Korea,
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Mexico, Chile and South Africa have either announced or already implemented policies
that put a price on carbon (World Bank and Ecofys 2015), and REDD+ will likely generate
additional  for  developing  countries’  government  budgets  (Koch  et  al.  2015).
Furthermore,  developing  countries  would  receive  funds  to  meet  infrastructure
investment  needs  if  some  part  of  carbon  pricing  revenues  was  transferred  across
countries,  in line with the principle that the full  incremental  costs of climate change
mitigation are to be covered by industrialized countries (UNFCCC 1992). Arguably, large
financial  transfers might be a politically contentious issue.  Yet,  it  seems unlikely that
developing  countries  will  cover  the  full  costs  of  emission  reductions  without  any
financial assistance, such that at least some support from industrialized countries, e.g.
via  the  Green Climate  Fund  (GCF)  (UNFCCC 2010),  should  be  expected  if  ambitious
climate change mitigation is realized. Even though to date it is unclear in how far the
envisaged climate finance of US$ 100 bn per year that shall be mobilized (by the year
2020)  will  indeed materialize,  the  GCF  currently  has  US$  10.2  bn  at  its  disposal  to
support mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.10 For  this reason, at least
some transfers are almost certain to occur. As a consequence, our benchmark scenario,
which assumes no redistribution, should be regarded as a conservative estimate of the





In this paper we have examined how climate change mitigation and infrastructure access
policies can be combined into a broader perspective of sustainable development. The
results  have  highlighted  the  considerable  potential  of  carbon  pricing  to  generate
revenues to close access gaps for water, sanitation, electricity, and telecommunications
and to improve existing transport infrastructure.
The respective potentials show substantial variation across types of infrastructures and
world regions. For the majority of countries, carbon pricing revenues would likely be
sufficient  to  provide  universal  access  to  water,  sanitation,  electricity,  and
telecommunications,  whereas  investment  needs  for  paving  all  unpaved roads  would
exceed carbon pricing revenues in most cases. Our results also highlight that for the
majority  of  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  carbon  pricing  revenues  would  be
insufficient to achieve universal access to all types of infrastructure other than water.
This observation is due to the high access gaps as well as low carbon pricing revenues
(resulting from low emissions) in this region.
In any case, it can be expected that the extent to which human development issues are
taken into account in the emerging global climate regime will be crucial for its success or
its failure. The results presented in this paper allow for a deeper understanding of the
role of carbon pricing for human development. They might also help to guide the design
of climate finance mechanisms. Currently, the discussion around climate finance mainly
revolves around the envisaged level of funding, with little attention being paid to the
question of how to ensure that the funds are spent effectively. For instance, experience
with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which was used to incentivize emission
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reductions  in  developing  countries  under  the  Kyoto  framework,  suggests  that  this
approach has not resulted in serious emission reductions (Schneider 2009). Hence, using
available funds to support carbon pricing instead of project-based finance might not
only  permit  cost-efficient  emission  reductions,  but  also  leverage  public  revenues  to
promote human development goals.
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Figure 1: Emissions and carbon prices (in year 2005 US$) in the year 2020 for the 450ppm scenario, which exhibits 
an even chance to limit global warming in the year 2100 to below 2°C compared to the pre-industrial level. Data are
from the EM-F27 model comparison (Blanford, Kriegler, and Tavoni 2014; Krey et al. 2014; Kriegler et al. 2014) for 
four regions: Asia (purple), Latin America (orange), Middle East and Africa (green) and the OECD (blue). Negative 
emissions imply removal of emissions from the atmosphere from e.g. biomass and CCS (BECCS) or afforestation. 
The dashed iso-revenue curves indicate all points that correspond to revenues from carbon pricing of US$ 100 bn, 
500 bn, and 1 trn, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES p2020 p2020 p2020 p2020
PPM450 27.79 62.56** 27.79 63.67**
(37.99) (23.77) (39.34) (24.15)
NoCCS 8.422 52.08* 8.422 53.44*
(37.99) (28.94) (39.34) (29.57)
LimBio 2.996 11.51 2.996 11.79





















Observations 39 39 39 39
R-squared 0.625 0.577 0.292 0.220
Table 1: Results of regression analysis to explain carbon prices in the year 2020 in 
different stabilization scenarios. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure  2:  Average  annual  revenues  from  carbon  pricing  under  different  stabilization  scenarios  (450ppm  and
550ppm)  and  technological  assumptions  (full  technology  portfolio,  limited  availability  of  biomass,  and
unavailability of CCS) by region in constant year 2005 US$ bn.
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Figure 3: Average annual revenues from carbon pricing under different assumptions on how revenues are 
distributed by region in constant year 2005 US$ bn. The case of X=0 denotes domestic carbon pricing, whereas X=1 
corresponds to an equal per-capita distribution of global carbon pricing revenues, and X=0.5 the average between 






















East Asia & Pacific 8.8 30.6 4.8 29.3 40.1
Europe & Central Asia 2.0 6.5 0.0 14.2 23.1
Latin America & Caribbean 6.2 18.4 5.2 23.0 81.8
Middle East & North Africa 9.2 11.1 5.3 13.8 21.9
North America 0.8 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.0
South Asia 10.6 61.8 25.6 67.9 46.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 36.7 69.6 68.1 59.8 79.6
Global 11.3 36.0 16.8 37.4 31.6
Table 2: Share of population lacking access to electricity, water, sanitation, telecommunication and share 
of unpaved roads by region according to World Bank classification. All data are for the year 2010. Source: 
World Bank (2014), ITU (2014), Pachauri et al. (2013).
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 Figure 4: Share of carbon pricing revenues required to finance universal access to infrastructure under domestic carbon pricing (i.e. without transfers between countries) for 
the 450ppm scenario with full technological availability. (a) Water, (b) Sanitation, (c) Electricity, (d) Telecommunication, and (e) costs of paving all unpaved roads. For 
description of data and sources see Section 3. Darker colors indicate higher shares, and dark purple shares exceeding one. Grey areas denote countries for which data are not 
available. Please note logarithmic scale.
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Figure 5: Results of sensitivity analysis showing minimum and maximum investment requirements (whiskers) as 
well as median values relative to carbon pricing revenues by region. Values larger than one indicate that revenues 
would be insufficient to cover investment needs. Please note different scales.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Share of carbon pricing revenues required to finance universal access to infrastructure for the 450ppm scenario with full technological availability, assuming that 
global carbon pricing revenues are distributed by the average between ‘no redistribution’ and ‘equal per-capita’ (i.e. X=0.5). (a) Water, (b) Sanitation, (c) Electricity, (d) 
Telecommunication, and (e) costs of paving all unpaved roads. For description of data and sources see Section 3. Darker colors indicate higher shares, and dark purple shares 
exceeding one. Grey areas denote countries for which data are not available. Please note logarithmic scale.
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